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Abstract
 
There are kinds of dialogue that support social 
justice and others that do the reverse. The kinds 
of dialogue that support social justice require that 
anger be bracketed and that hiding in safe spaces 
be eschewed. All illegitimate ad hominem/ad 
feminem attacks are ruled out from the get-go. 
No dialogical contribution can be down-graded 
on account of the communicator’s gender, 
race, or religion. As well, this communicative 
approach unapologetically privileges reason in 
full view of theories and strategies that might 
seek to undermine reasoning as just another 
illegitimate form of power.
On the more positive side, it is argued in this 
paper that social justice dialogue will be enhanced 
by a kind of “communicative upgrading,” which 
amplifies “person perception,” foregrounds the 
impersonal forces within our common social 
spaces rather than the “baddies” within, and 
orients the dialogical trajectory toward the 
future rather than the past. Finally, it is argued 
in this paper that educators have a pressing 
responsibility to guide their students through 
social justice dialogue so that their speech 
contributes to the amelioration of injustice, rather 
than rendering the terrain more treacherous.
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Un diálogo a favor de la justicia social
Resumen
Hay diálogos que apoyan la justicia social y otros que hacen lo contrario. 
Los que apoyan la justicia social requieren que la ira “quede en el tintero” 
y evitar esconderse en el lugar seguro. Todos los ataques ilegítimos 
ad hominem/ad feminem se descartan desde el principio. Ninguna 
contribución en el diálogo se puede subestimar a razón del género, la raza 
o la religión del hablante. Así mismo, el enfoque comunicativo de la justicia 
social privilegia sin tapujos la razón frente a teorías y estrategias que podrían 
tratar de desvirtuar el razonamiento como una forma ilegítima de poder. 
Por otro lado, y de manera más positiva, en este artículo se argumenta 
que el diálogo de justicia social se verá reforzado por una especie de 
mejora comunicativa, que amplifica la percepción de la persona, destaca 
las fuerzas impersonales que están dentro de nuestros espacios sociales 
comunes, en vez de a los villanos, y orienta la trayectoria dialógica hacia el 
futuro más que hacia el pasado. Finalmente, se afirma que los educadores 
tienen la urgente responsabilidad de guiar a sus estudiantes a través del 
diálogo de justicia social para que sus contribuciones ayuden a disminuir 
la injusticia en lugar de hacer que el terreno sea más traicionero.
Palabras clave: impacto de la comunicación, ética de la comunicación, 
educación y cultura, cambio social, justicia social
Un dialogue en faveur de la justice sociale
Résumé
Certains dialogues soutiennent la justice sociale et d’autres font l’inverse. 
Ceux qui soutiennent la justice sociale nécessitent que la haine soit laissée 
de côté afin d’éviter de se cacher en lieu sûr. Toutes les attaques illégitimes 
ad hominem/ad feminem sont rejetées dès le début. Aucune contribution 
au dialogue ne peut être sous-estimée, en raison du genre, de la race ou 
la religion du locuteur. De même, l’approche communicative de la justice 
Pr
ax
is
 &
 S
ab
er
  -
  V
ol
. 1
0.
  N
úm
. 2
3 
 - 
 M
ay
o 
- A
go
st
o 
20
19
 - 
Pá
g.
 2
15
-2
33
217
A dialogue in support of  social justice
ISSN 2216-0159 E-ISSN 2462-8603
sociale privilégie, sans ménagement, la raison par rapport à des théories 
et des stratégies visant à dénaturer le raisonnement en tant qu’une forme 
illégitime de pouvoir. Par ailleurs, et de façon plus positive, cet article 
développe l’idée que le dialogue de la justice sociale sera renforcé par 
une sorte d’amélioration communicative qui amplifie la perception des 
personnes, souligne les forces impersonnelles se trouvant à l’intérieur de 
nos espaces sociaux communs à la place d’exalter les méchants, et oriente 
la progression dialogique vers le futur plutôt que vers le passé. Enfin, il est 
indiqué que les enseignants ont un besoin urgent de guider leurs étudiants 
dans le dialogue de justice sociale afin de diminuer l’injustice grâce à leurs 
contributions, au lieu de rendre le terrain encore plus mouvant.
Mots-clés : impact de la communication, éthique de la communication, 
éducation et culture, changement social, justice sociale
Um diálogo em favor da justiça social
Resumo
Há diálogos que apoiam a justiça social e outros que fazem o oposto. 
Aqueles que apoiam a justiça social requerem que a ira “fique no tinteiro” e 
evitar esconder-se no lugar seguro. Todos os ataques ilegítimos ad hominem/
ad feminem são descartados desde o princípio. Nenhuma contribuição 
para o diálogo pode ser subestimada com base no género, raça ou religião 
do falante. Da mesma forma, o enfoque comunicativo da justiça social 
privilegia abertamente a razão frente a teorias e estratégias que poderiam 
tentar desvirtuar o raciocínio como uma forma ilegítima do poder. Por 
outro lado, e de forma mais positiva, este artigo argumenta que o diálogo 
da justiça social será reforçado por uma espécie de melhora comunicativa, 
que amplifica a percepção da pessoa, destaca as forças impessoais que 
estão dentro de nossos espaços sociais comuns, em vez dos vilãos, e orienta 
a trajetória dialógica rumo ao futuro e não ao passado. Finalmente, afirma-
se que os educadores têm a urgente responsabilidade de guiar seus alunos 
através do diálogo de justiça social para que suas contribuições ajudem a 
diminuir a injustiça em lugar de fazer que o terreno seja mais traiçoeiro.
Palavras-chave: impacto da comunicação, ética da comunicação, 
educação e cultura, mudança social, justiça social
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Introduction
Injustice is a blemish on humanity. Attempts by many to right 
these wrongs are legion. There are those who use violence as a 
way of “making things right.” Groups such as the Black Panthers 
or the Taliban might fall into those categories. Alternatively, there 
are those who would utilize the power of dialogue and negotiation 
to bring about what they believe is a more stable global culture. 
Figures such as Martin Luther King, Gandhi, or Mandela might 
come to mind here.
For present purposes, we will assume that this latter course of 
action is preferable, but this still leaves open an important question: 
What type of dialogue has the best chance of ameliorating the forces 
of injustice in our world? This question is crucial because our 
collective failure to address it has led to the entrenchment of the 
belief that virtually all communicative interchanges—particularly if 
orchestrated by the victims of injustice—are conducive to creating 
a better world. This belief is faulty. In support of this claim, we 
will argue that there are certain kinds of dialogue that do just the 
reverse—that is, there are certain kinds of dialogue that actually 
stall or impede progress towards a more just world.
We will argue that if the intent is indeed to move towards a 
more just world rather than merely to vent or retaliate, then the 
dialogue must be of a certain kind. Specifically, we will argue that 
dialogue in support of social justice requires that anger be bracketed 
and that hiding in safe spaces be eschewed. Importantly, this means 
that ad hominem/ad feminem attacks are ruled out from the get-go. 
No dialogical contribution can be down-graded on account of the 
communicator’s gender, race, or religion—and yes, that includes the 
ideas of white, straight males. As well, the proposed communicative 
approach unapologetically privileges reason in full view of theories 
and strategies that might seek to undermine reasoning as just 
another illegitimate form of power.
On the more positive side, we will argue that social justice 
dialogue will be enhanced by a kind of communicative upgrading 
that amplifies person perception, foregrounds the impersonal forces 
within our common social spaces rather than the baddies within, 
and orients the dialogical trajectory toward the future rather than 
the past.
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In what is to follow, we will begin by investigating some of the 
common reactions individuals have to injustice. We will then explore 
the underlying dangers involved in adopting each of these reactions. 
Then, as noted above, we will outline some markers that will assist 
in orienting communicators during their discussions, in order to 
move forwards toward a genuinely more just world. Finally, we will 
speak to educators in particular, and argue that they have an urgent 
and pressing responsibility to guide their students through social 
justice dialogue so that their contributions support the possibility 
of mitigating forces of injustice, rather than rendering the terrain 
more treacherous. 
 
Reactions to injustice
Understandable anger
In the past, some women have argued that men have absolutely no 
right to comment on issues such as abortion, sexual harassment, 
or child care. Proponents of this position argue that allowing male 
voices into dialogue on such issues is like inviting a wolf in sheep’s 
clothing to enter the protective enclave of female solidarity. The 
belief seems to be that men will potentially disrupt the fabric of 
what little progress women have made on these issues thus far.
This anger is of the sort that Nussbaum (2016) calls well-
grounded, i.e., it is based on the truth and fact that women have 
indeed been oppressed for eons. However, she goes on to say 
that while anger may have some instrumental value as a signal to 
oneself that something is wrong with a situation, and may serve as a 
motivation to address the wrongdoing or as a deterrent to others, it 
nevertheless impedes progress towards social justice.
Her major theme is Deweyan, in the sense that it is grounded 
in the belief that all of us have the responsibility to try to develop 
ways to live together in a manner that is potentially beneficial to 
all. As such, we all need to be part of a dialogical process of equal 
participants who come together in an honest and open attempt to 
articulate a common future. Treating others as likely criminals (as 
one does when slamming the door against the wolf) is just about 
the worst way to begin if you want someone to cooperate as an 
equal(Nussbaum, 2016, p. 243).
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Despite this point, Nussbaum recognizes how the thoughts 
of payback can be intensely satisfying. She even quotes Aristotle’s 
comment that thoughts of retribution are often pleasant (p. 17). 
Nonetheless, we all need to recognize that attempting to reverse 
injustices through down-ranking does nothing to create equality 
(p. 29). Yes, women have been kept out of the conversation for 
centuries, however, carving out dialogical spaces for women only—
or for the colonially-oppressed only—is not painting a vision of a 
more inclusive future, instead, it is just a mirror image of what has 
been.
Ensuring that underprivileged voices are 
privileged
In 2017, a Jewish conservative named Ben Shapiro went on tour and 
visited a number of universities around America. Shapiro’s talks 
centered on the importance of political diversity and free speech. 
Ironically, Shapiro was confronted by student protests when 
speaking at a number of these Universities, including California 
State, the University of Wisconsin, Penn State University, and UC 
Berkeley (The Daily Wire, 2017).
In the aftermath of the tour, Shapiro testified in front of the 
United States Congress about how these protestors likely justified 
their actions, and how the underlying logic of their beliefs posed a 
threat to the First Amendment in America, and free speech more 
universally (The Daily Wire, 2017).
The first controversial idea Shapiro identified to be fueling 
anti-free speech sentiments was intersectionality. Intersectionality 
Theory was first introduced by Kimberley Crenshaw in 1989 (Lorenz, 
2013). Although the theory has had various iterations, it suggests 
that an individual’s group identities — i.e., their race, gender, social 
class — can be used to determine how privileged they are within a 
given society. This theory is often used by social justice proponents 
to advocate two controversial ideas. The first of these is that the 
voices and viewpoints of those with less privilege should be valued 
over the voices and perspectives of those with more privilege. The 
second controversial idea is that the voices of the most privileged 
— which are often attributed to straight, white males — should be 
silenced outright in conversations surrounding certain topics, such 
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as social justice. In his book 12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos, 
Peterson (2018) suggests that both of these ideas are iterations of 
Derrida’s more fundamental idea that the powerless or oppressed 
should be privileged, and that powerful or oppressors ought to be 
silenced (p. 312). In short, advocates of this view push the idea 
that group identity should be used as a litmus test for determining 
whether you ought to speak and/or the value of the ideas that you 
do put forth.
Clearly it is the case that heretofore silenced voices must be 
protected from the roar of what may appear to be potentially 
oppressive messages. Nonetheless, echoing Nussbaum yet 
again, silencing such messaging does not seem like a fruitful 
strategy in the journey toward a future of equals. Carving out 
dialogical territory for the oppressed only is not productively 
contributing to a vision of a more inclusive world; instead, it is 
merely an attempt to reverse a power dynamic that is already 
considered problematic by those trying to flip it on its head. 
In his article “Freedom as Antipower,” Pettit (1996) writes: 
how might we guard the powerless against subjugation by the 
powerful? One way would be to reverse roles, of course, and give 
them power over others rather than letting others have power 
over them. But that would only relocate the problem not resolve 
it (p. 588).
Ensuring safety 
In a recent study of young people who grew up connected to the 
internet, i.e., those born after 1995, Twenge (2017) discovered that 
unlike previous generations, the idea of safety was at the core of 
iGen’s values, which she speculated may be the result of helicopter 
parenting and over-protection. What is particularly interesting about 
this finding is that safety, for iGens, is not just protection from physical 
harm, but protection from emotional harm as well (p. 144). What 
this entails, in practice, is that speech which is perceived as hurtful 
is often shut down by simply citing the emotional harm it causes. As 
Twenge writes, “in recent years, safe spaces have become popular on 
college campuses as responses to visits by controversial speakers: if 
students are upset by a speaker’s message, they can come together in 
a separate location to console one another” (p. 154).
       This concern for safety should be taken seriously. Anyone who 
feels unsafe in a conversation will undoubtedly be inclined to either 
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fight or flee, neither of which are conducive to a reasonable or productive 
interchange. Nonetheless, we suggest that using safety to justify dialogical 
censorship should only be reserved for instances in which the emotional 
suffering is arbitrary or unnecessary, or for instances in which the speech 
poses a serious physical threat to those mentioned—e.g., speech inciting 
violence. In limiting their censorship responses and overcoming their 
reticence to listen to scary messaging, we suggest that such individuals 
may actually benefit from a higher, more anchored sense of safety through 
acquiring an enhanced and more balanced perspective of the issue at hand. 
In correspondence with this view, Anderson (2015), in his article “Creating 
Investors, Not Tourists: How to Care for the Linguistic Ecosystem,” writes:
Guarding [individuals’] emotional skin, may be directly harmful 
to them. In support of this position, Susan Gardner, in her paper 
“Questioning to Hesitation Rather than Hesitating to Question,” 
argues that one ought to be warier of questioning that is soft 
and otherwise shallow, than forms of questioning that lead to an 
agent’s uncertainty. What Gardner is suggesting is that a point 
of emotional upheaval in the agent, which results from pointed 
questioning, is in fact positive as it assists in overcoming pre-
established beliefs in light of new reasons. Similarly, in his book 
The Mess Inside, Peter Goldie argues that radical adjustments to 
one’s motivational set are more likely to take place when agents 
are exposed to situations that force them to see things in another 
light. (p. 145)
In the same vein, developmental psychologist Jean Piaget argues 
that states of conflict  between contradictory beliefs 
catalyze paradigmatic shifts, and that, without these internal 
struggles, one’s moral development would remain stagnant (xii-
xiii)
What all three authors’ arguments have in common is the view 
that oftentimes an internal state of conflict is not something to 
be avoided. On the contrary, this internal state of conflict often 
indicates a moment of reconstruction, in the sense that one’s 
motivational set is undergoing adjustment. Likewise, internal 
conflict often indicates that the issue at hand is deeply important 
as opposed to a trivial venture. (p. 291)
Lukianoff & Haidt (2015), in their on-line article “The Coddling 
of the American Mind,” also argue that victims benefit from facing, 
rather than distancing themselves from that which is perceived as 
unsafe. Citing the most basic tenets of psychology, they note that 
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the absolute least helpful strategy for helping someone who has 
developed an anxiety disorder after being trapped in an elevator is to 
try and restructure their world so that they can avoid elevators! With 
regard to creating safe spaces for college and university students, 
they argue that: Rather than trying to protect students from words 
and ideas that they will inevitably encounter, colleges should do all 
they can to equip students to thrive in a world full of words and 
ideas that they cannot control. One of the great truths taught by 
Buddhism (and Stoicism, Hinduism, and many other traditions) is 
that you can never achieve happiness by making the world conform 
to your desires.
Despite the benefits of listening to potentially scary opposing 
viewpoints, doing so may nonetheless be beyond the emotional 
strength of particular individuals—i.e., it may be just too difficult 
for a rape victim to engage in a discussion about how the injustice 
of sexual abuse should be handled. In such circumstances, rather 
than trying to silence potentially upsetting messages, we suggest 
that a better option would be to lean on the strength of those whom 
one trusts to give a fair and accurate account of what others have to 
say. One can do this with the confidence that it is only by allowing 
a position to be heard that it can be demonstrated as untenable. As 
Mill (1860) so famously argued:
He who knows only his own side of the case knows little of 
that. His reasons may be good, and no one may have been able 
to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons 
on the opposite side, if he does not so much as know what they 
are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion. [...] Nor is it 
enough that he should hear the opinions of adversaries from his 
own teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by 
what they offer as refutations. […] He must be able to hear them 
from persons who actually believe them. […] He must know them 
in their most plausible and persuasive form. (p. 163)
Discrediting reasoned communication 
altogether
Drawing on ideas from Foucault and Derrida, Said (as cited in 
Daniel, 2005) argues “that rationality and human nature are 
historical constructions, and that the task of post-colonial thought 
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is to undermine the hegemony of Western Rationality” (p. 400). 
Derrida, too, takes aim at the sort of reasoned communication that 
many typify as Western, when he suggests that communicators, or 
meaning makers, cannot be considered reliable because they carve 
up the world with a vested interest in mind. For Derrida (as cited 
in Daniel, 2005), “the repression at the origin of meaning is an 
irreducible violence” (p. 302). Thus, if meaning networks persist 
because of power and not because of their superior capacity to 
map reality—i.e., the signified in his language—this seems to carry 
the implication that we should abandon reasoned communication 
altogether.
However, we would argue that such a move or attitude is 
unhelpful. On the one hand, it seems irrefutably clear that reasoned 
truth-seeking—not illegitimate, interpersonal power moves—have 
brought us technological wonders such as modern medicine, air 
travel and the computer. And with regard to social justice, if we 
reject reasoned truth-seeking as a way to right wrongs, the only 
other obvious alternative would seem to be a violent struggle for 
power. The worry, in other words, is that if we reject reasoned 
communication because it can be, and has previously been, used 
to solidify illegitimate power, then won’t we end up ensuring that 
sheer raw power will reign supreme? By contrast, we suggest that 
while reasoned communication can be, and has previously been, 
used to stabilize illegitimate power, it also can be, and has previously 
been, used by such brilliant orators as Martin Luther King, Gandhi, 
Mandela, and Wilberforce, amongst many others, to destabilize 
illegitimate power. It is for this reason that Bloom (2013) in his book 
Just Babies: The Origins of Good and Evil writes, “[just] as we have 
used reason to make scientific discoveries, such as the existence of 
dinosaurs, electrons, and germs, we have also used it to make moral 
discoveries, such as the wrongness of slavery” (p. 207).
To those in the postmodern movement who worry that accepting 
the potential benefit of reasoned communication might discredit 
their bone fides, we would like to remind them that even Derrida 
(as cited in Daniel, 2005), in his article “Afterword: Toward an 
Ethic of Discussion,” writes “the value of truth (and all those values 
associated with it) is never contested or destroyed by my writings,” 
(p. 298) and that even within interpretative contexts, “it should be 
possible to invoke rules of competence, criteria of discussion and of 
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consensus, good faith, lucidity, rigor, criticism, and pedagogy” (p. 
298).
In conclusion then, we suggest without hesitation that we all 
ought to acknowledge the fact that, like all human systems, the 
reasoning enterprise is susceptible to being corrupted and tainted 
by those who use it. Nonetheless, this should not be used as a charge 
against the reasoning enterprise itself. To abandon this tool simply 
because of past corruption would be to abandon what may be the 
only viable tool available to us to overcome injustice.
Summary of reactions to injustice
If we are ever going to make headway toward greater social justice 
in this world, we need more people to work together to make that 
happen. If we are to create a formidable force in the service of 
good, we need to communicate with one another honestly, openly 
and empathetically. To do that, we need to turn away from anger, 
turn away from the over-privileging of hitherto underprivileged 
voices, turn away from ensuring the emotional safety from reasoned 
opposing viewpoints, and turn away from the undermining of 
reasoned dialogue altogether as a result of barbs flung from obscure, 
elitist philosophical theorists. We suggest that all of us, both those 
who are part of what might be considered an oppressive class—or 
religion, or sexual orientation, or race, or gender—and those who 
have been victims of that oppression, turn to the possibility of 
communicative upgrading in order to facilitate a genuine forward 
movement toward a world where there is at least potentially justice 
for all.
 
What communicative upgrading might look like
Amplifying person perception
One might assume that, given such tactics as ad hominem attacks 
and shutting out opposing viewpoints (both by those who are 
viewed as oppressors and by those viewed as oppressed), the first 
step toward enhancing social justice through communicative up-
grading would be to up-grade everyone’s reasoning skills. Though 
superlative reasoning skills may indeed be necessary for transparent 
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and efficient dialogical interchange, an even more important factor 
is rising beyond what Benjamin (2018) refers to as the “doer and 
done to” position by strengthening what Gardner & Wolf (2018), in 
their paper “In the Shadow of Our Time,” call person perception, 
or what Hicks (2011) refers to as the perceived dignity or inherent 
worth of both self and other.
Hicks (2011) argues that “dignity violations” in interpersonal 
interchange are the norm rather than the exception, and that dignity 
assaults are registered by the brain as symbolically equivalent 
to physical assaults (pp. 7, 14, 51, 54-56). Since dignity violations 
ensure that all parties feel under attack, it is no wonder that very 
little listening and understanding results from such interchanges.
And while dignity violations seem easy to spot when authored 
by a perceived oppressor, Hicks notes that dignity violations are 
likewise often inherent in the communication of those who identify 
as victims. Thus, Hicks (2011) argues that:
The temptation to see the other person as the perpetrator and 
oneself as the innocent victim is one the greatest obstacles to 
resolving conflict in relationships. Our need to be both right and 
done wrong by is an outdated survival strategy that creates big  
problems for us today. (p. 143)
And she writes elsewhere:
Treating people badly because they have done something wrong 
only perpetuates the cycle of indignity. What is worse, we violate 
our own dignity in the process. Others’ bad behavior doesn’t give 
us license to treat them badly in return. (p. 5)
Hicks goes on to say that whatever the perceived issue is, whether 
it be a past or present injustice, all of us need to be open to how we 
might be contributing to the problem (p. 143). This is the case because 
how we contribute to the problem may be precisely the lens through 
which the other sees us—we view the other as a victimizer which is 
precisely how they see us—and, thus, such acknowledgement begins 
to open up a way for each of us to perceive one another in shades of 
grey (p. 148), rather than in a black-and-white manner, as oppressor 
and oppressed — i.e., to see one another as equal members of the 
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“perfectly imperfect” human species (Gardner & Wolf, 2018) —. She 
likewise suggests that all parties have a responsibility to articulate 
how they might contribute to a collective resolution. 
Interestingly, Hicks (2011) lists safety and understanding 
among the ten essential elements necessary to preserve dignity, 
which, in light of the current reticence to hear and understand 
what are perceived to be unsafe messages, may seem to land us in 
a contradiction, i.e., it may not be possible to understand the other 
and feel safe at the same time. Hicks avoids this contradiction by 
arguing, instead, that those who have hitherto felt unsafe and/
or humiliated must learn to rise above their histories, and ensure 
that they do not perpetuate a cycle of indignity. She argues that, 
if those of us who have felt unsafe do not learn to heal from these 
early imprints of indignity, then we will become controlled by them 
and hence continue to hurt others, “jeopardizing their and our own 
dignity and threatening all our relationships” (Hicks, 2011, p. 53).
With regard to understanding the viewpoints of others — i.e., 
even those who we might consider unsafe — Hicks argues that we 
should always start from the position that what others think matters, 
we should give them the chance to explain and express their points 
of view, and we should actively listen in an effort to understand—
even if, ultimately, we do not agree. (p. 81)
Focus on the forces of the system
In a Time commentary on Rosling’s (2018) book Factfulness, Bill 
Gates argues that this book should be a must read for everyone, 
as it clearly points out not only how the world is making amazing 
progress on many fronts, including social justice, but also why 
our “biases tend to coax us into seeing the reverse” (Begley, 
2018). Knowing that “we have come a long way” nudges us 
toward duplicating successful strategies, and hence accelerates 
our collective movement forward. By contrast, believing that 
we are stuck in tragic circumstances tends to hijack our efforts 
and energy, and encourages us to seek out scapegoats. Gates’ 
legitimate worry about scapegoating is complemented by 
his worry about our propensity for hero-worship. He says: 
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With a few exceptions, things don’t get better because of heroes. 
There were heroes 1,000 years ago, and the world was awful. 
Modernity is a miracle of systems. Jonas Salk was an amazing 
scientist, but he isn’t the only reason we’re on the doorstep of 
eradicating polio —it’s also thanks to the coordinated vaccination 
effort by health workers, NGOs, and governments. We miss the 
progress that’s happening right in front of us when we look for 
heroes instead of systems. If you want to improve something, 
look for ways to build better systems.
In his paper “Freedom as Anti-power,” Pettit (1996) also urges 
individuals to keep focused on systems rather than particular people 
occupying positions within a given system. He writes: 
How might we guard the powerless against subjugation by the 
powerful? One way would be to reverse roles, of course, and give 
them power over others rather than letting others have power 
over them. But that would only relocate the problem not resolve 
it. The question is how we might guard people in general against 
subjugation, not how we might guard some particular subgroup.
(p. 588)
Pettit argues that the power relocation strategy is often 
advocated because we hold a zero-sum view of power. However, Pettit 
argues that if we abandon this tug of war perspective—where one 
group has to lose ground in order for another to gain it—and instead 
entertain the idea that you can simply empower the disenfranchised 
in order to equalize a power disparity, then maybe we can take 
positive steps toward subjugation-free environments, i.e., change 
the system. Pettit calls this novel strategy antipower. Antipower, in 
practice, involves “giving the powerless new, empowering resources 
of their own” relative to the context where that power differential 
exists. (pp. 589-590)
Pettit advocates for some traditional forms of antipower, such 
as regulatory policies and legislation. However, he recognizes, to 
one degree or another, that this is merely a Band-Aid solution to a 
much deeper problem. So instead, Pettit advocates for interventions 
that are
designed to empower certain people—to give them equality in 
basic capabilities—and thereby to guard them against various 
forms of subjugation, and the various forms of vulnerability 
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these subjugations entail. […] Such measures are necessary in 
a society like ours to render people more resistant to various 
forms of interference by others and thereby to domination by 
them: the better educated and the better informed are less easily 
harassed or duped for example. (p. 591)
Enhancing the education of those who might be vulnerable 
to oppression is a viewpoint with which we strongly concur, and a 
point to which we will return below. 
Imagining the future
Damasio (2010) has provided significant empirical evidence to 
support the claim that ultimately it is somatic marking that drives 
human action and thought. What he means by this is that most of 
our perceptions are colored by emotion. This, indeed, is what he 
argued was Descartes’ fundamental error, i.e., since ultimately the 
body is our source of emotion, a brain suspended in a vat would be 
incapable of thought (Damasio, 1995).
What is particularly interesting about somatic marking within 
the present context is that while one’s past may be emotionally-
laden — and hence forever knocking on their conscious brain — it is 
not at all clear how one’s imagined future can be seen or heard over 
all of this disruptive noise.
The challenge, then, is how to emotionally color an envisioned 
future. Gardner (2009), in her textbook Thinking Your Way to 
the Freedom, has argued that, in order for a future vision to gain 
magnetism, precision is crucially required. That is, we need to have 
a precise idea of how to take the next steps forward (pp. 61-62). 
Gardner’s contention is supported by research on goal achievement, 
which has found that fantasizing and daydreaming about future 
goals actually impedes progress towards goal achievement when it 
is not accompanied by a precise plan (Oettingen, Mayer & Portnow, 
2016: Oettingen & Wadden, 1991). Just thinking that we should have 
a more equal society is certainly laudatory, but far too imprecise 
to guide or direct our behavior. Therefore, educators ought to 
devote a significant amount to time to improving education so 
that students are encouraged to not only focus on specifics of their 
present behavior, but to imagine creative and precise alternatives 
that may have sufficient magnetic power to direct future behavior — 
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i.e., instead of just bemoaning the loss of animal habitat, how about 
volunteering for a NGO, and/or sending money to environmental 
charities, and/or voting for the candidate who has a precise 
environmental platform? —
Focusing on past ills is tempting because it is easy. Focusing on 
how to create a better world is not so easy. But if we keep in mind 
that the future is the only place where we will find a better world, 
then we will know how to act when we find ourselves in unproductive 
interchanges that seem stuck in the habit of dredging up all the ills 
of the past. We might, for instance, find that a fruitful tactic may be 
simply to ask: “what do you suppose the first step toward a better 
world or a better life might look like?” which brings us to the special 
responsibility of educators with regard to enhancing dialogue 
toward the amelioration of social justice.
 
The responsibility of educators
How to make this world a more just place for all, including our non-
human cousins, is a pressing question for many young people. For 
that reason, it is the responsibility of all educators to be prepared 
to accompany their students in their quest to think through what 
is required of them to make peace with themselves and others as 
they face this challenge. As they dive into issues of social justice, it 
is critical that educators keep a firm grip on the helm so that their 
well-intentioned efforts are not shipwrecked.
We suggest that educators find their bearings by keeping their 
eyes on the horizon, i.e., assist students in somatically marking the 
future. If by contrast, students are more focused on past storms that 
have left a disquieting wake (e.g., if, for instance, in their rage, they 
focus on how to forcefully right historical injustices by punishing the 
descendants of oppressors) then they need to be invited to reflect on 
the possibility that this may only invert the problems of the past, 
and that such strategies ultimately will lead to power battles likely 
to devolve into tribalism and potentially even bloodshed—e.g., the 
Cambodian genocide. Students also need to be invited to reflect 
on whether they see themselves primarily as an amalgamation 
of their group identities—i.e., their skin color, their gender, their 
socioeconomic class—or whether it is their thoughts, ideas and 
values that ultimately anchor who they are.
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In their pursuit of social justice, educators themselves must 
recognize their particular responsibility to ensure that all youngsters 
have equal access to the kind of education that allows them to 
think through how best to lead their lives, given the circumstances 
that they find themselves in. This is precisely why initiatives like 
Philosophy for Children are so crucial: by reaching children at an 
early age, we can help level the playing field by giving youngsters 
some of the structure they might otherwise lack in their lives, and 
equip them to participate in the dialogical arena with peers who 
might not face the same generational roadblocks.
To those educators of a post-modern bent, we suggest that 
undermining the reasoning enterprise as a way of destabilizing 
what is perceived as illegitimate power structures catches the 
wrong target in the crosshairs. All of us can agree that starving 
marginalized groups of reason has historically been used as a 
method of oppression—e.g., women shut out of educational 
opportunities. Thus, to try and overcome oppression by depriving 
everyone of reason is no more eloquent a solution than the horrid 
suggestions of Vonnegut’s (1961) classic Harrison Bergeron, where 
the entire populace is handicapped in order to end inequality. Our 
efforts ought to be focused on creating opportunities for historically 
oppressed populations, not universally eliminating the tools that 
have historically helped other groups flourish.
 
Conclusion
To suggest that those of us who are concerned with social justice 
should focus on changing the system rather than engaging in down-
ranking tactics may seem decidedly unsexy, particularly for those 
who would strive to follow in the path of their past revolutionary 
heroes. It needs to be kept in mind, however, that down-ranking 
tactics are inherently a whack-a-mole game—although one gets 
an adrenaline rush during every whack, these tactics ultimately do 
not result in any concrete universal progress—instead, they merely 
reorganize and redistribute power. 
We must accept the fact that there will always be some who 
fare better than others—that inequality, in one form or another, 
will always exist. Despite this fact, some systems are inherently 
better than others, and manage to ensure that all are given an equal 
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opportunity. If we adopt this perspective, we will be more inclined to 
focus on the tedious work of continuing to change the rotten planks 
of our seaworthy vessel that we so desperately need to sail through 
the ocean of never-ending challenges that make up the plight of 
humankind. There is no end to history; we can just have epochs that 
are better or worse.
Even Derrida (as cited in Daniel, 2005) argues that discussion 
and argument are “always contextual and never legitimated 
by absolute, extradiscursive, or nonpolitical criteria” (p. 267), 
nonetheless, he believes that we can and 
should think of moral improvement or advances in social justice 
in terms of that which is better than (and always relative to) the 
status quo. In that way, we could always imagine better laws, 
better ways of doing things, without having to identify an absolute 
best. (p. 267)
Our time is now. Let us all engage in reasoned dialogue together 
so that we move toward a more just world.
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